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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, 
FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAWMAKING SYSTEM 
Michael B. Rappaport* 
As a fusionist, 1 or moderate libertarian with conservative 
influences, I was alarmed by the election of Barack Obama and a 
largely Democratic Congress. Based on Obama's campaigning 
and his voting record, I believed that he was likely to strongly 
favor a variety of programs that would significantly increase the 
size of government. Combined with a Congress that had large 
Democratic majorities in both houses. the stage seemed set for a 
large expansion of government. 
Increasing the risk of government growth was the financial 
crisis that preceded the election. The financial sector's significant 
problems led many people to anticipate a severe economic 
downturn, perhaps one approaching that of the Great 
Depression. With an emergency of that kind. people often look 
to the government to do something to address the problem. 
Thus, President Obama and the Congressional Democrats 
seemed to have both the power and opportunity to significantly 
grow the government. Moreover, the Administration appeared 
to recognize this too. as suggested by Chief of Staff Rahm 
Emmanuel's infamous statement that "[y]ou never want a 
serious crisis to go to waste."' 
The possibility of another New Deal is a scary thought to 
someone with small government views. Yet, this was certainly 
not the only possible result. The last time there was a 
* Class of 1975 Professor of Law. University of San Diego. I would like to thank 
John McGinnis for comments on an earlier draft of this essav. 
I. My fusionism derives primarily from Friedrich Hayek's works. See. e.g .. 
FRIEDRICH HAYEK. THE Co~snn_;no~ OF LIBERTY ( 1%0). Another form of fusionism 
is associated with the works of Frank Mever. See FRA"K MEYER. IN DEFE~SE OF 
FREEDOM: A CONSERVATIVE CREDO ( 1962)·. 
2. See Gerald F. Seib. In Crisis, Opporrunitr for Ohama. WALL ST. J .. Nov. 21. 
2001( at A2. 
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Democratic President, with large Democratic congressional 
majorities, who sought to restructure health care, the result was 
not larger, but smaller government. The two years when 
President Clinton and the Congressional Democrats governed 
led to a rejection of health care restructuring and a Republican 
takeover of Congress. Thus, one possibility is that the Obama 
presidency might lead the country to reject big government ideas 
and to replace them with the smaller government notions. I have 
called this "the Carter/Clinton scenario'' -a reference to the last 
two times that Democrats controlled all three lawmaking 
branches, which led to the smaller government victories of 
Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich.' 
Reflections on these different possible results-of a Second 
New Deal, of the Carter/Clinton scenario, and of something in 
between-naturally leads one to ponder the forces in the 
political system that determine whether one party rule leads to 
fundamental institutional change, like the New Deal, or to a 
rejection by the voters. It also leads one to ponder the normative 
question of whether, and how much, a constitutional system 
should place limits on a majority's ability to enact fundamental 
change. 
In this short essay, I explore fundamental institutional 
change and argue that a desirable constitution should constrain 
such change. I argue that many of the reasons that justify strict 
limitations on the passage of constitutional amendments also 
justify constraints on fundamental institutional change. I then 
show that the modern American constitutional system does 
place significant limits on basic institutional change. Far from 
allowing a single election in which a short term majority can 
secure power to enact enormous change, it employs several 
limitations on radical change, including the American tri-
cameral lawmaking system and the institution of midterm 
elections. I then examine three historical periods, that of the 
New Deal, the Great Society, and the early Clinton 
Administration, to support my analysis. I conclude by applying 
the analysis to the Obama Administration and suggesting that if 
it does enact fundamental institutional change, it will do so only 
by surmounting the not insubstantial checks that the American 
constitutional system places on such change. Finally, I should 
3. While the Republican Party generally embraces smaller government than the 
Democrats, it certainly has its big government wing of which George W. Bush and John 
McCain were recent leaders. If the Carter/Clinton scenario places Republicans in control 
of the lawmaking branches. it would likely be the Republicans' smaller government wing. 
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note that this essay was completed, except for minor style edits, 
at the end of October, 2009, when it was not clear whether, and 
if so, in what form, the Democrat's health care restructuring 
would pass. I have not changed the essay to reflect subsequent 
developments. 
I. THE TWO SENSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
In examining the ability of a majority to effect fundamental 
change, it is useful to distinguish two different senses of the 
constitution of a country and two corresponding senses of 
constitutional change. The first meaning of a constitution is a 
document that contains the fundamental law of the nation. 
Under this meaning, constitutional change occurs when the 
document's provisions are altered. The most obvious way to 
alter them is through constitutional amendments, but sometimes 
the courts can as a functional matter. if not a formal one, effect 
constitutional change by reinterpreting the constitution's 
meaning. 
The second meaning of a constitution is an older one. One 
can understand the constitution of a nation as "the basic 
principles and laws of a nation ... that determine the powers and 
duties of the government and guarantee certain rights to the 
people in it.''~ There is nothing in this definition about a written 
document.' Instead, it refers to the basic principles and laws of a 
nation. Under this definition. the most important legal and 
political institutions would count as the constitution of the 
nation, even though they were not described in a single 
document. Constitutional change would then occur when those 
fundamental principles and laws were altered. To distinguish this 
type of constitutional change from the previous one, I shall call 
this type ''fundamental institutional change." 
The New Deal involved both types of constitutional change. 
First, during the New Deal, the Supreme Court altered its 
interpretation of the Constitution to vastly expand federal power 
and to relax other constitutional limitations, such as the 
separation of powers and the protection of economic liberties. 
4. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIO'OARY 248 (10th ed. 1997). 
5. In fact. the dictionary goes on to state as a distinct definition. "a written 
instrument embodying the rules of a political or social organization... MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 248 (lOth ed. 1997). F~r a recent discussion of 
one version of this understanding of a constitution. see Ernest A. Young. The 
Constirution Outside the Constitution. 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007). 
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While the document was not formally amended. the functional 
meaning of the Constitution was dramatically changed. 
Second. the New Deal changed the nation's fundamental 
institutions. moving us from a country of limited government 
and federalism to one with a larger government, at both the state 
and federal level, that regulated the economy and provided an 
economic safety net. It is true that an interpretive change of the 
document's meaning was necessary to effect these changes in 
fundamental institutions. Without those interpretive changes. 
most of the institutional changes might have been deemed 
unconstitutionaL as the National Industrial Recovery Act was." 
But even if no interpretive changes had been necessary, the large 
number of significant institutions that the New Deal enacted. 
including the Social Security Retirement Program. unemployment 
insurance, federal deposit insurance, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. the Works Progress Administration, the securities acts. 
and the National Labor Relations Act. transformed the nature of 
American government and society. 7 
Of these two types of constitutional change. it is the second 
type that is raised by the election of Barack Obama. It is true 
that President Obama could have significant effects on the 
Supreme Court, since the Court is now often split 5-4, with 
Justice Kennedy as a swing vote. If Justice Kennedy or one of 
the four more conservative justices were to step down, then the 
replacement that Obama appoints could be quite important, 
shifting the Court's balance of power. But as significant as this 
might seem, it is not what now appears most consequential for 
the nation. The Court has been closely divided for a long time. 
Moreover. it seems unlikely that Justice Kennedy or the four 
more conservative justices would voluntarily step down to allow 
Obama an appointment. Thus, a vacancy of this kind, although 
not impossible. seems unlikely, at least during Obama 's first 
term. 
Rather, it is the possibility of the second type of 
constitutional change that is the prime concern. There is a range 
of legislation that the Obama Administration seems to support 
that would effect dramatic change. To mention just the most 
important examples, the Obama Administration, first, favors a 
substantial restructuring of health care. with a significant public 
6. See ALA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935): 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
7. See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text. 
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option that is often discussed by both left and ri&ht as a means of 
moving towards a governmental system. Second, the 
Administration also favors a substantial cap and trade law that 
would significantly restrict greenhouse gases by allocating 
allowances to businesses.9 Third, the Administration has 
proposed large changes to the financial regulatory system, with 
new agencies and additional regulatory powers. 10 Fourth, the 
Administration seems likely to support the Employee Free 
Choice Act. 11 Under this legislation, which Obama co-sponsored 
as a Senator.12 unions could be formed by a majority of workers 
signing a card, rather than through a secret ballot, and 
mandatory arbitration could be used to resolve the first union 
contract. Finally, the Administration supports a large number of 
programs that increase government involvement in education at 
levels ranging from preschool to higher education. 13 
If all of these programs were enacted, they would establish 
quite dramatic, perhaps radical, change in government 
institutions. The basic laws, institutions, and principles of the 
American system of government- its constitution- would have 
been altered. 
II. HOW SHOULD A CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
GOVERN FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE? 
The possibility of such dramatic change raises the question 
of what limitations a constitutional system should place on such 
fundamental institutional change. In this section, I argue that 
fundamental institutional changes, like changes of the 
8. Robert Pear. Doctors' Group Opposes Public Insurance Plan. N.Y. TiMES. June 
11.2009. at A19. 
9. Helene Cooper & John M. Broder. At M.l. T., Obama Presses Case for Focus on 
Using Renewable Energy. N.Y. TiMES. Oct. 24. 2009. at A13. 
10. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOL'NDATION 10-18 (2009). available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/ 
Final Report_ web.pdf. 
11. H.R. 1409. 111 th Con g. (2009): S. 560. lllth Cong. (2009). 
12. See GovTrack: Senate Vote on Cloture to Motion to Proceed: H.R. 800 (llOth]: 
Employee Free Choice Act of 2007. available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
vote.xpd?vote=s2007 -227. 
13. See generally Transcript of The President's Remarks to the Hispanic Chamber of 
Commerce (Mar. 10. 2009). http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-
President-to-the-United-States-Hispanic-Chamber-of-Commerce/ (discussing support for 
numerous government programs including Early Head Start. Head Start. the Earlv 
Learning College Grant. the Teacher's Advancement Program. and increased Peil 
Grants): see also Libby Quaid. Obama Backs Teacher Merit Pav. Charter Schools. 
ASSOCIATED PRESS. Mar. 10. 2009. available at http://abcn~ws.go.com/Politics/ 
wireStory?id= 7044733. 
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constitutional document. should be significantly constrained to 
further important goals, such as consensus, nonpartisanship, and 
more accurate decision making. Such fundamental institutional 
change should only occur if it can surmount significant 
procedural hurdles. 
To analyze limitations on institutional change, we can 
imagine a system in which no significant limits on such change 
exist. Assume. then, a stylized version of the political system of 
Great Britain. Under this system, laws are enacted by a single 
legislative house that operates under parliamentary principles 
with the same party controlling both the legislature and 
executive. Because there are no additional constitutional 
constraints. a majority of the legislature could theoretically pass 
any law (except perhaps a law that changes this arrangement). 
Moreover. a majority. absent losing a vote of no confidence, 
could govern for five years without holding an election. Clearly. 
such a system would allow enormous institutional change- the 
second type of constitutional change- to be passed with a simple 
majority. 
In the United States. it is generally thought undesirable to 
allow constitutional change of the first type- of the 
constitutional document- to be made by legislative majorities. 
To pass a constitutional amendment at the federal level. one 
needs to surmount a double supermajority rule of two thirds to 
propose and then three quarters to ratify. 1• In my view. these 
supermajority rules generate desirable constitutional 
amendments. because they promote several important features 
of a . good. constit~tion, such as consensus ~UP~,ort, 
nonpartlsanship, and bemg based on accurate factual beliefs. · 
But these rules do not apply to the second type of 
constitutional change- fundamental institutional change. Yet, 
many of the same reasons for restricting changes in the 
constitutional document also suggest restricting changes in 
fundamental institutions. Provisions in the constitutional 
document are generally entrenched against repeal through the 
ordinary legislative process and therefore they last for long 
periods. It is this characteristic of constitutional provisions that 
generally justifies employing supermajority rules. While basic 
14. See L'.S. Co:-;sT. art. V. While manv commentators believe these supermajority 
rules are too strict. thev often favor some supermajority rule. just a more lenient one. 
15. See John 0. ·McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport. Majority and Supermajority 
Ruin: Three Vinn of the Capitol. R5 TEX. L. RE\. 1115. 1170-R2 (2007). 
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institutional changes are not formally entrenched, they 
nonetheless are difficult to repeal and therefore share some of 
the functional characteristics of entrenchments. First many of 
the fundamental institutions enacted during the New Deal as 
well as those proposed by the Obama Administration operate as 
entitlement legislation. 16 They grant people a right to certain 
benefits, usually at a cost significantly below what they would 
otherwise have to pay. Once these entitlements are enacted, the 
beneficiaries typically fight hard to protect their "rights'' from 
being repealed or reduced. 
The functional characteristics of entrenchments are also 
shared by other types of legislation, such as regulatory laws. 
Such regulatory laws can also benefit significant interest groups, 
such as organized business or labor interests. Moreover, the 
regulatory agency that administers the law is an important 
beneficiary, with significant knowledge and access to the 
lawmakers to lobby against its repeal. It is striking that so few 
administrative agencies have been eliminated over the years. 
Given the difficulties of reversing fundamental institutional 
change, strong arguments exist for placing checks on a simple 
majority's ability to enact it. The arguments for these checks are 
similar to but distinct from those for constitutional amendments. 
Thus, there are strong benefits from employing supermajority 
rules and from using other mechanisms that limit short term 
majorities from enacting fundamental institutional change. 
First, one reason to check fundamental institutional change 
is to increase the chances that it is supported by a consensus of 
the country. Enacting fundamental institutional change under 
simple majority rule would be problematic because it allows a 
mere majority to enact basic changes that might be strongly 
opposed by a large minority. Requiring a supermajority rule 
here would necessitate more of a consensus to enact such basic 
changes. 
Second, another reason to check fundamental institutional 
change is to promote its enactment based on the public interest 
rather than on partisan considerations such as what will help the 
majority's political party. Unfortunately, legislators often 
support programs that would promote key constituents of their 
party, such as labor unions or corporations, even if that would 
not be good policy. Requiring a supermajority to enact basic 
16. The paradigmatic New Deal example is Social Securitv. Presumablv. both 
health care and cap and trade would function much like entitlement~. · 
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provisions, however, will often require one party to secure 
support from the other party to pass legislation, thereby 
reducing the partisanship involved. 
A third reason to place limits on fundamental institutional 
change is to promote enactment through procedures that make it 
likely to lead to good results. One problem with fundamental 
institutional change that cannot easily be repealed is that it lasts 
for a long period. Enacting desirable long term provisions is 
difficult because it requires hard-to-acquire knowledge of how 
these institutions will operate over time. Moreover, people have 
a tendency to assume that existing circumstances that might 
support these programs will continue in the future. 1' People also 
tend to be too prone to believe that programs designed to 
achieve certain results will actually do so. If people, then, are too 
quick to enact such provisions, then one might want to require 
additional support for such programs to increase the likelihood 
that the programs that are enacted actually have the effects they 
are intended to have. 
A final reason to limit fundamental changes it that it 
prevents a short term majority from making relatively 
permanent changes. Sometimes a party can gain a large majority 
because of a scandal (such as Watergate) or an aberrational 
issue, but not have the nation's support on other issues. In this 
situation, it is useful to have mechanisms. other than 
supermajority rules, that limit that majority from passing laws 
the public does not support. One such mechanism that I discuss 
here is to require the majority to secure support again in an 
upcoming election. 
III. RESTRICTING FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE: THE SIMPLE MODEL 
How. then, does the American constitutional system 
restrain basic institutional change? One central feature of that 
system, which differs from our stylized British system, is that the 
American system employs three separate lawmaking entities: the 
House, the Senate, and the President. Each of these entities is 
elected in a different way. As Buchanan and Tullock pointed out 
nearly a half century ago, this system operates as a kind of 
supermajority rule. 1R It requires more support from the populace 
17. McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 15. at 1173. 
18. JAMES M. BuCHANA~ & GORDON TULLOCK. THE CALCL'LCS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOLJNDA TIONS OF CONSTITCTIONAL DEMOCRACY 23~8 ( 1962). 
2010] OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 223 
to secure a majority in each of these lawmaking institutions than 
to do so in a single legislative house. 
This check requires that the lawmaking institutions differ 
from one another, which they do in a variety of ways. First, they 
are selected by different electorates, with House members 
elected by districts, but Senators and the President elected by 
the entire state. Second. they are elected at different times for 
different periods, with all House members standing for election 
every two years, the President every four years, and Senators 
every six years, with one third of the Senate standing every two 
years. Thus, the lawmakers will reflect the views of electors from 
different periods and will have different degrees of insulation 
from the electorate. Finally, the lawmakers will often be elected 
based on distinct considerations, with the President often being 
selected for his foreign policy expertise and House members for 
more domestic considerations. Overall, then, the differences in 
the lawmaking branches operate to establish a relatively weak 
supermajority rule. 
In addition to this implicit supermajority rule, there is also 
the express supermajority requirement of overcoming the Senate 
filibuster. Ending a filibuster has required three-fifths of the 
Senate since 1975, but generally required two thirds of the 
Senate for much of the twentieth century. It is true that the 
filibuster is not a constitutional requirement, but Senators have 
strong incentives to keep the filibuster, since it enhances their 
individual power. 
As a result of the filibuster, the majority party needs not 
only the presidency and a House majority, but at least 60 
Senators to enact its agenda. This requirement makes it even less 
likely that a party will be able to secure the requisite support. It 
is not so easy to secure 60 percent of the Senate along with 
control of the presidency and the House of Representatives. 
Of course, even if a single party does secure a dominant 
majority, that would not necessarily result in fundamental 
institutional change. It would also be necessary for the key 
players in that party-the President and a majority of the party's 
caucus in each house-to be in favor of such change. But that 
will not always be the case. For example, President Carter had a 
dominant majority in 1976, but did not seem to pursue basic 
institutional change. 19 
19. While the Democrats have had dominant majorities at various times since the 
New Deal. these numbers often overstate the party's power because on issues. such as 
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If one party does secure the requisite majorities, it then has 
two years to enact its agenda before having to face the voters 
again. But after two years, the entire House of Representatives 
and one third of the Senate would stand for reelection. Thus, if 
the fundamental institutional change sought by the majority 
party was popular, the majority party would retain its power and 
could continue with its agenda. But if the voters disapproved of 
the radical agenda, they could put an end to it. They could do 
this by providing control of the House to the other party or 
reducing the majority control of the Senate below the level 
necessary to end a filibuster. Thus, the constitutional system 
places a two year limit on a temporary majority's ability to enact 
fundamental institutional change without facing the voters. 
IV. RESTRICTING FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE: THE MORE COMPLEX MODEL 
While the simple model presented in the previous section 
suggests that there is a check on fundamental institutional 
change, this model actually understates the check. A more 
complex model suggests that the American constitutional system 
imposes a greater check that derives from two additional 
sources: from a more realistic analysis of the actual power of 
legislative majorities and from the shadow of the midterm 
elections. 
While the simple model assumes that a majority of sixty 
percent in the Senate and fifty one percent in the House is 
necessary to pass large institutional change, this prediction may 
understate the requisite degree of support. Suppose that the 
Democrats hold 60 Senate seats and therefore require every 
Democratic Senator's vote to end a filibuster. To pass sweeping 
legislation, the Democrats will certainly need the support of a 
majority of their party. But having the support of the majority 
does not mean that they will also have the support of the most 
moderate members of their party. The most conservative 
Democratic Senators are likely to have different political 
preferences and may not, despite the forces of party loyalty, go 
along with the bulk of their party's agenda. In this situation, the 
dominant party may not be able to enact the sweeping 
legislation. 
civil rights. the party was split. with Southern Democrats being strongly opposed. 
Democratic opponents of expansion of the New Deal also appeared to have placed a 
break on fundamental change during Roosevelt's second term. 
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To pass this sweeping legislation, the dominant party may 
need a comfortable margin over the minimum necessary to pass 
a law. If the Democrats in the above example had 68 Senators, 
then they could lose 8 Senators and still pass the legislation. In 
this situation, none of the Senators would enjoy the monopoly 
power to hold out his support in return for undue benefits. 
Moreover, with 68 Senators, the Democrats would be more 
likely to find 60 Senators who ideologically favor the legislation. 
Thus, enacting fundamental institutional change would be much 
easier with majorities larger than the minimum necessary to pass 
a law. 
The second feature of the more complex model involves the 
time during which the dominant majority can enact its agenda.20 
While the simple model implies that the majority party has two 
years to enact its agenda before the midterm election, a more 
subtle analysis suggests that there is less time before the voters 
may make their opinions known. As the majority party proceeds 
to enact its agenda, the voters can express their views through 
public opinion polls. If the country dislikes the measures that the 
majority party is enacting, the popularity of the President and 
the congressional majority will decline. The members of this 
party who are up for reelection and are most vulnerable to losing 
their seats may then refuse to go along with these unpopular 
measures. 
In this way, the shadow of the midterm elections operates to 
constrain the dominant majority. Thus, there is not even a two 
year period before the majority must face the voters. Instead, it 
might be as short as six months or a year before the public can 
make their feelings known and begin to cut back on a radical 
agenda.c1 
20. A temporal dimension enters into the analysis in another way. To secure the 
large supermajorities necessary to pass enormous institutional change would ordinarily 
require more than a single congressional election. By largely requiring a party to obtain 
the support of the voters at more than one election. the political system makes it more 
difficult for a temporary majority to enact radical change. 
21. These models assume that only a single party enacts radical change, but this is 
an oversimplification. Sometimes members of the two parties may be split on issues and 
controversial legislation can be enacted through a coalition. as occurred with enactment 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The 
Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and Its Interpretation. 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003). At other times, a majority 
party may have significant. but not dominant control of the lawmaking branches, and 
may secure additional support for popular legislation from members of the other party. 
An example of this situation is the Reagan Administration's enactment in 1981 of 
substantial tax cuts with the support of a significant number of Democrats. See STEVEN 
F. HAYWARD. THE AGE OF REAGAN: THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 
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The various mechanisms highlighted in these two models 
operate to place limits on fundamental institutional change at 
the federal level. While these mechanisms are certainly desirable 
for the reasons discussed above, I do not argue that they are 
ideal, because other considerations might favor different 
mechanisms.22 One additional complication concerning these 
mechanisms is that they apply to both ordinary legislation and 
legislation that effects fundamental change. As a result, they are 
not ideal for either type of legislation. 23 If one makes the 
mechanisms ideal for fundamental institutional change, then 
they will block too much ordinary legislation. If one makes them 
ideal for ordinary legislation, they will permit too much 
fundamental institutional change. Thus, the mechanisms need to 
be a compromise between the ideals for basic institutional 
change and for ordinary legislation.2~ 
V. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES SUPPORTING THE 
ANALYSIS 
We can illustrate and support this analysis by examining 
three diverse historical examples. These examples involve one 
dominant majority that passed enormous institutional change for 
two years and then secured the approval of the voters for more 
substantial change; another dominant majority that passed 
enormous institutional change during its initial years and then 
was stopped by the midterm elections; and a third, smaller 
dominant majority that was not even able to enact substantial 
change during its initial two years. 
1980-1989. at 144--66 (2009). Ultimately. the mechanisms that limit fundamental change 
also work when that change is effected through a bipartisan coalition. 
22. Unfortunately. I do not have space to address these other considerations. To 
mention just one example, if one favors small government. then one might advocate strict 
limits on federal power. as existed under the original Constitution. so that most 
fundamental change has to occur at the state level under a system of state competition. 
See also McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 15. at 1126-40 (discussing use of more 
focused supermajority rules to protect against biases in favor of certain types of 
legislation). . . . 
23. It may be necessary that the mechanisms apply to both ordmary leg1slatwn and 
legislation that effects fundamental change. because it is difficult to draw a clear 
distinction between these two types of legislation. 
24. For a discussion of the proper mechanisms for enacting ordinary legislation. see 
McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 15. at 1126-40. 
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A. THE NEW DEAL 
The paradigmatic example of fundamental institutional 
change is the New Deal. While the New Deal transformed the 
nation's institutions, it did so because of its electoral triumphs. 
In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt won a landslide election 
following Herbert Hoover's unpopular response to the Great 
Depression. The 1932 election also produced enormous gains for 
the Democrats in Congress with the Democrats picking up 97 
seats in the House and 12 in the Senate. See Figure 1.25 This 
translated into 73 percent of the House and 62 percent of the 
Senate. Significantly, in the 1934 midterm elections, the 
Democrats did not lose seats, but gained 9 additional 
Representatives and 8 more Senators. Democratic gains 
continued in the 1936 elections, with the party finally suffering 
losses only in the 1938 midterm elections. 
Year House %Dem Senate %Dem 
1930 220D 214R 51 47D 48R 49 
1932 313D 117R 73 59D 36R 62 
1934 322D 103R 76 69D 25R 73 
Figure 1 
These dramatic and consistent electoral victories translated 
into enormous institutional change. The initial victories allowed 
Congress in 1933 to enact Federal Deposit Insurance,26 the 
Glass-Steagall Act,2- the Civilian Conservation Corps.,28 the 
Public Works Administration,2" and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.'() Congress also passed securities laws in 193331 and 
1934.32 In addition, the 1933 Congress also passed the National 
Industrial Recovery Ad3 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act,34 
which allowed the federal government tremendous power over 
industrial and agricultural production. Both of these statutes, 
25. These totals and those in the other figures in this essay are derived from 2 
Gl'IDE TO CO:--iGRESS 1307--{)8 (6th ed. 2008). 
26. Emergency Banking Act. Pub. L. No. 73-1.48 Stat. 1 (1933). 
27. Banking Act of 1933. ch. 89.48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
28. Pub. L. No. 73-15.48 Stat. 22 (1933). 
29. The Public Works Administration was created by The National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1933. ch. 90. 48 Stat. 195 (1933 ). 
30. Tennessee Valley Authority Act. ch. 32.48 Stat. 58 (1933). 
31. Securities Act of 1933. ch. 38.48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
32. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. ch. 404. 48 Stat. 881 (1934 ). 
33. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. ch. 90.48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
34. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Pub. L. No. 73-10.48 Stat. 31 (1933). 
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however, were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court.'' 
Had the Democrats lost a substantial number of seats in the 
1934 midterm elections, the New Deal might have ended. But 
instead, they gained seats. allowing for the Second New Deal. In 
1935. Congress was able to enact further fundamental change, 
including the Social Security Retirement Program,36 
Un.emplo~ment Insuranc~,'7 Aid to Familie~ with D~pendent 
Children, and the NatiOnal Labor Relations Act. These 
extremely important programs became largely permanent 
changes to the American political landscape. 
The New Deal experience thus supports my analysis. First, 
the New Deal was able to enact radical institutional change by 
securing very large majorities. These majorities were huge in 
1932 and grew over time, with the Democrats enjoying 
approximately 75 percent of Congress in 1934. Second, the New 
Deal kept the confidence of the people. While the voters could 
have placed a brake on the Democrats in 1934 (or 1936), they 
endorsed the New Deal with Democratic electoral victories. The 
New Deal was not the result of a short term majority, but of a 
significant change in the beliefs of the American people. 
B. THE GREAT SOCIETY 
The second example of fundamental institutional change is 
the Great Society (including the Civil Rights Laws) passed 
during the Johnson Administration. With the assassination of 
President Kennedy in 1963, Lyndon Johnson became President, 
inheriting a significant Democratic House and Senate. See 
Figure 2 . .w But in the 1964 election, Johnson and the 
congressional Democrats demolished Barry Goldwater and the 
Republicans, gaining 37 seats in the House and 1 in the Senate. 
The election left the Democrats with over two thirds of both the 
House and Senate. In the 1966 midterm elections, however, the 
Democrats suffered significant defeats, losing 47 seats in the 
House and 4 in the Senate. 
35. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding 
the National Industrial Recoverv Act unconstitutional): United States v. Butler. 297 U.S. 
1 (1936) (holding the Agricultur~l Adjustment Act to be unconstitutional). 
36. Social Securitv Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 201-210.49 Stat. at 622-25. 
37. Social Securitv Act. Pub. L. No. 74-271. §§ 301-303,49 Stat. at 625-26. 
38. Social Security Act. Pub. L. No. 74-271. §§ 401-406. 49 Stat. at 626-28. 
39. Pub. L. No. 74-198.49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
40. 2 GL'IDE TO CONGRESS. supra note 25. at 1308. 
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Year House %Dem Senate %Dem 
1962 258D 176R 59 67D 33R 67 
1964 295D 140R 68 68D 32R 68 
1966 248D 187R 57 64D 36R 64 
Figure 2 
The Great Society began in 1964 after the change from a 
more moderate President Kennedy to a more aggressive 
President Johnson. Johnson pushed throu_Bh the Civil Rights A~t 
of 1964,41 the Food Stamps program,- and the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964.43 This last law established the office of 
Economic Opportunity to administer a variety of programs 
dubbed the War on Poverty, including VISTA. the Model Cities 
Program, Upward Bound, and Head Start.44 
While these programs were significant, it was the next 
Congress- with its enormous majorities- that passed the most 
extensive and controversial changes. In 1965, Congress enacted 
both Medicare4' and Medicaid,46 the Votinft Rights Act:7 the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act.4 which for the first 
time provided significant federal aid to public education, the 
Immigration and Nationality Services Act, which abolished 
national origin quotas,4" and legislation creating the National 
Endowments for the Arts and Humanities.'" 
This fundamental institutional change again supports my 
analysis. First, the Democrats needed substantial majorities to 
41. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L No. 88-352. 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
42. Food Stamp Act of 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-525. 78 Stat. 703 (codified at 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 2011 2036 (2000)). 
43. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-452. 78 Stat. 508 (1964 ). 
repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35. § 683(a). 95 Stat. 519 (1981). 
44. See Deborah J. Cantrell. Common Ground: The Case for Col/aboratimz Between 
Anti-Poverty Advocates and Public Interest Intellectual Prop~m· Ad~·ocates. 15 VA. J. 
Soc. POL'Y & L. 415.420 n.l9 (2008) (discussing the funding of VISTA as part of the 
War on Poverty): Jeffrey S. Lehman. To Conceptualize, to Criticize, to Defend. to 
Improve: Understanding America's Welfare State. 101 YALE L.J. 685. 695 (1991) (briefly 
discussing the Model Cities program. Upward Bound. and Head Start). 
45. Social Security Act of !965 Title XVIII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (2000). 
46. Social Security Act of 1'165 Title XIX. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13'16-1396v (2000). 
47. Voting Rights Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 8'1-110. 79 Stat. 437. 
48. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-10. 7'1 Stat. 
27. 
49. Immigration and Nationality Services Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-236. 7'1 Stat. 
911. 
50. National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities Act of I '165. Pub. L. No. 89-
209.79 Stat. 845 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-68 (1988 & Supp. 111'190)). 
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pass this legislation, with the huge majorities in 1964 allowing 
Congress to pass the most controversial and radical changes. 
Second, the Great Society largely stopped after the 1966 
midterm elections, when the nation appeared to record its 
disapproval of the extent and pace of Democratic governance 
through large Republican gains. Thus. unlike the New Deal, 
which gained seats after the midterm elections, the Great Society 
lost support and was essentially terminated. 
C. THE EARLY CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND 
HEALTH CARE RESTRUCTURING 
The last historical example involves the 1992 election of Bill 
Clinton. Prior to this election, the Democrats had enjoyed 
significant control of the Congress. while the Republicans had 
held the White House. Thus, the election of a Democratic 
President seemed like it might lead to significant change. The 
Democrats now had control over all three lawmaking branches. 
with healthy majorities in the House (59 percent) and Senate (57 
percent). See Figure 3.51 The only real limitation was that 
Democrats did not enjoy a filibuster proof Senate majority. Two 
years later in the midterm elections. however. the Democrats 
lost both the House and the Senate. 
Year House %Dem Senate %Dem 
1992 258D 176R 59 57D 43R 57 
1994 204D 230R 47 47D 53R 47 
Figure 3 
During its first two years, the Clinton Administration 
pursued a variety of legislative proposals, but overall they did 
not constitute dramatic change.'" The one potential example of 
dramatic change involved the Administration's attempt to pass a 
51. 2 GUIDE TO CONGRESS. supra note 25. at 1308. 
52. The Clinton Administration enacted NAFT A. but did so with the assistance of 
more Republicans than Democrats. See Ranko Shiraki Oliver. In the Twelve Years of 
NAFT A, the Treaty Gave Me ... What, Exactly 7 : An Assessment of Economic, Social, and 
Political Developments in Mexico Since 1994 and Their Impact on Mexican Immigration 
into the United States. 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 53. 65 n.58 (2007). The Administration 
also was able to have Congress enact a tax increase on higher income individuals and 
corporations. while expanding the earned income tax credit. but this hardly seems 
enormous. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Pub. L. No. 103-66. 107 Stat. 
312. The Administration also attempted to allow gays to serve in the military. with the 
result that the Don't Ask. Don't Tell policy was enacted by Congress. Pub. L. No. 103-
160 (codified at 10 U.S. C.§ 654). 
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comprehensive health care plan that would have radically 
changed the health care system.'' After much debate, the plan 
was resisted in both the House and Senate, and ultimately 
defeated. 
One way to understand the health care defeat is to see it as 
the result of overreaching by the Clinton Administration. While 
the Democrats certainly had a substantial majority, that majority 
was not of the overwhelming size that the Democrats enjoyed 
during the New Deal or Great Society. The Clinton 
Administration may also have overestimated its power due to 
confusion about the meaning of its election. President Clinton 
had campaigned as a New Democrat, which led people to 
believe he would not pursue dramatic leftward change. 
Moreover, Clinton may have been elected only because there 
was a three-way race, with Ross Perot taking many votes from 
George Bush. Thus, the country might have elected President 
Clinton, even though it did not favor dramatic change toward 
government health care. 
Once again, the failure of the Clinton Administration to 
enact substantial institutional change supports my analysis. The 
Democrats, especially the liberal wing of the party, did not have 
sufficient majorities to secure passage of the Administration's 
health care plan. Moreover, the midterm elections allowed the 
voters to express their disapproval of the Democratic Congress's 
behavior. Thus, what appeared to be a short term majority was 
eliminated. 
VI. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
This brings us to the 2008 election, which placed Barack 
Obama in the White House and significantly strengthened the 
Democrats' congressional majorities. Initially, one suspects that 
both the Obama Administration and many of its critics believed 
that the Administration would be able to enact a large portion of 
its agenda and thereby effect fundamental institutional change. 
But at presene4 it is not clear how much of that agenda, besides 
the Stimulus Law, will be enacted. 
53. Whether the Clinton Administration's health care plan. by itself. constituted 
fundamental change might be disputed. Certainly. the Clinton agenda was much less 
ambitious than the Obama agenda is. But it is unnecessary to answer this question here. 
because the country rejected the Clinton health care plan. whatever kind of change it 
represented. 
54. The "present" here refers to the end of October. 2009. the point at which the 
essay was substantially completed. 
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Clearly, the Democrats have a significant majority. They 
have 58 Senators plus 2 Independents who caucus with them, 
making for the 60 Senators necessary to end a filibuster. They 
also have a 258-177 advantage in the House. While substantial, 
these majorities fall far short of the Democrats majorities during 
the New Deal and the Great Society. They are much closer to 
those enjoyed by the Clinton Administration, with the important 
exception that the current Democrats are better able to 
overcome the filibuster. 
Another similarity with the Clinton Administration is that it 
is by no means clear that Obama was elected to pursue a left 
wing agenda. While Obama famously campaigned on "change" 
and certainly talked about health care reform, he also appeared 
to run as a non-partisan candidate who would work with the 
Republicans-not something that a dramatic move to the left 
would allow. Moreover, Obama, who also ran as something of a 
post-racial candidate, seemed to benefit from many people's 
desire to elect the first African-American President.'" 
Obama also benefited politically from the severe economic 
downturn that preceded the election. This downtown occurred 
on George Bush's watch and it was natural for the public to 
blame the Republicans for the crisis. Voters who supported 
Obama because of the recession would naturally expect his 
primary concern to be restoring the economy rather than 
pursuing other goals. 
These factors suggest that there might be strong resistance 
to Obama's agenda for substantial change. Two of the principal 
items on the agenda-health care restructuring and cap and 
trade-are not really attempts to address the downturn. In fact, 
these proposals may exacerbate the crisis, because they are likely 
to involve increases in taxes, debt, or costs of production. If 
these legislative proposals were responding to the downturn, the 
Obama Administration would probably find it easier to enact 
them, since it would be addressing a problem widely held to 
require efforts to solve it. 
The Stimulus Law does appear to be directed at the 
recession,"" but even this law has been a source of great 
controversy. Many critics view the law as another example of the 
55. Although some people. no doubt. opposed Obama because of his race. it is my 
judgment that the political benefits far outweighed the costs for him. 
56. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-5. 123 Stat. 
115. 
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Obama Administration pursuing a big government agenda 
rather than addressing the recession. They believe that the law is 
too costly and focuses on expenditures rather than tax cuts.'" 
Moreover, they argue that the bulk of the expenditures, which 
are directed towards government rather than the private sector, 
do not occur immediately, but only years in the future.'" In 
addition, the Obama Administration now seeks to make one 
third of the Stimulus expenditures permanent.'" In addition to 
suggesting that the Stimulus Law was part of a big government 
approach. the critics also claim that the lack of Republican 
support for the Stimulus. with no House Republicans and only 
three Senate Republicans supporting it. indicates that Obama 's 
promises of non-partisanship were hollow. 
These concerns about President Obama pursuing an 
ideological agenda in a partisan manner, combined with a 
continuing decline in the economy,w have had their effect on his 
popularity. According to the Gallup PolL Obama's job approval 
rating was in the low 60s in his first two quarters, but fell 9 points 
to 53 in the third quarter."1 This historically large decline"' left 
Obama with a relatively low approval rating for this time in his 
57. See generally H.R. REP. No. 111-16. at 413-71\1 (2009): see also National 
Association of Realtors. American Recm-err and Reim'fSiment Acr of 2009. 
http://www.realtor.org/government_affairs/gapubiiciamerican_recovery_reinvestment_ 
act_home (noting that roughly 35% of the stimulus package was devoted to tax cuts. with 
the rest devoted to spending). 
5K See Edward P. Lazear. Op-Ed. Do We Need a Second Srimulus". WALL ST. J .. 
July 9. 2009. at Al5. available ar http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI24709595712615003. 
html (noting that according to the Congressional Budget Office. the largest amount of 
the stimulus spending occurs in 2010. and the amount spent in 2011 is nearly as much as 
spent in 2009). 
59. Alex Brill & Amy Roden. A Sickening De(icir. FORBES.C0\1. Oct. IR. 2009. 
http://www .forbes.com/2009/ I 0/ I R/heal th-care-stimul us-deficit -opinions-contributors-
alex-brill-amy-roden.html ( .. All told. the Obama administration's budget seeks to make 
at least 37% of ARRA ·s spending and tax cuts permanent on an annual basis ... ). 
60. Between January and September of 2009. the unemployment rose more than 2 
points from 7.6 to 9.8 percent. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor Force 
Statistics from the Current Population Survey. http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/ 
SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_n umbers&series_id=LNS 14000000 (last visited 
Oct. 25. 2009). At the end of October. however. the Department of Commerce 
announced that the economy had grown 3.5 percent in the third quarter of 2009. which 
growth. if sustained. might signal the official end of the recession. See Catherine 
Rampell. U.S. Economv Began ro Gnm· Again in 3rd Quarrer. N.Y. TI~1ES. October 30. 
2009. at AI. available ar http://www.nvtimes.com/2009/10/30/business/economv/ 
30econ. h tml ?ref= business. · · 
61. See Gallup Poll. http:/;www.gallup.comlpoll; 123806;0bama-Quarterlv-
Approval-A verage-Siips-Nine- Po in ts.aspx. · 
62. According to Gallup ... the 9-point drop in the most recent quarter is the largest 
Gallup has ever measured for an elected president between the second and third quarters 
of his term. dating back to 1953 ... Gallup Poll. supra note 61. 
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presidency, and within 5 points of Bill Clinton's low 48 percent 
at the comparable time in his presidency.63 Significantly. 
Obama's approval rating is even lower among independents.~>-~ 
These declines in Obama's popularity reduce his ability to enact 
his agenda. The less popular he and his proposals are, the less 
likely that marginal legislators will support them. 
While these weaknesses raise the possibility that Obama 
will not enact all or most of his agenda, this is merely a 
possibility, not a certainty. Obama has many resources, including 
large congressional majorities and a majority of his party who 
appear to strongly favor these measures. Moreover. his 
popularity could improve significantly at any time, especially 
with an upturn in the economy. 
The point of this analysis has not been to predict whether 
President Obama's agenda will be enacted. At this point, there is 
no way to know. Instead, it has been, first, to describe the 
significant limitations on fundamental institutional change that 
the Obama Administration is now confronting. The mere fact of 
substantial congressional majorities does not necessarily 
translate into transformative legislative enactments. One needs 
political support to enact fundamental institutional change and 
the degree of Obama's support is now being tested. Perhaps the 
most that can be said now is that Obama will find it much easier 
to enact his full agenda if he and the Democrats are able to 
maintain political support in subsequent elections. 
Second. the analysis speaks to the legitimacy of Obama 
either passing or failing to pass fundamental institutional change. 
If Obama is able to enact his full agenda, then he would have 
successfully surmounted a system that puts real constraints on 
the passage of fundamental change. His agenda could not. then, 
easily be dismissed as that of a short term majority that had 
exploited its powers. Rather, in a sense, the Democrats would 
have earned their enactments (whether or not one regards them 
as desirable). But if Obama fails to enact his full agenda-if he 
63. See Gallup Poll. supra note 61 ( .. But after the drop in his support during the 
last quarter. his average now ranks near the bottom for presidents at similar points in 
their presidencies ... ) Moreover. President Obama·s approval is below 50 percent under 
the Rasmussen poll. which queries likely voters. See Rasmussen Reports. Obama 
Approval Index History. http://www.rasmussenreports.cornfpublic_content/politics/ 
obama_administration/obama_approval_index_history (last visited October 20. 2009) 
(Obama approved by 47 percent. while disapproved by 52 percent of likely voters). 
64. Gallup Poll. for the week ending February 7. Obama·s approval for 
Independents is 46 percent. at http://www.gallup.com/poll/politics.aspx (last visited 
February 11. 2010). 
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enacts only some parts or only watered down versions-then one 
can say that desirable checks on substantial change had operated 
to block it. 
Of course, that the existing political system places a check 
on fundamental institutional change does not mean it is the ideal 
check. One might forcefully argue that the original 
Constitution's more robust federalism was a superior system 
because it required that most fundamental change be enacted by 
states in competition with one another. But unfortunately that 
system is gone for now, and perhaps, forever. The existing 
system does a tolerable job and it is that system that the Obama 
Administration must confront. 
